I believe there were a number of factors, some rooted in history, differing stages of development, different foreign policy interests, etc. I do not see the issue, as many do, as essentially ideological. Rather, the statement by Deng Xiaoping as to the reasons for the Sino-Soviet split seems quite persuasive: “the Soviet Union did not treat China on an equal footing.”

I am not quite sure what is meant by “doctrinal nationalization.” If it refers to the notion of the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to national conditions and national culture, then I believe that one can speak in these terms. Mao Zedong, for example, was very explicit about the “Sinification of Marxism-Leninism” as a necessity for its adoption in China.

To be technical, the PRC has not abandoned its ideological commitment to socialism, nor to Marxism-Leninism as a theoretical construct. What it has abandoned is the practice of socialism as it had historically been conceived and the adoption of the capitalist mode of production. China began this process in late 1978, over a decade before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was traumatic to China, not a source of relief.

Again, I am not sure what this question means. I do not know of any bilateral military agreements between Russia and China. The 2001 Friendship Treaty, unlike the 1950 Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, does not have a military component. The two states stress in their joint communiqués and through other channels their unanimity on issues of missile defense (actually this is not quite true—as they do not have wholly congruent positions on the topic of theatre missile defense), the militarization of outer space, non-proliferation, etc. The two states have participated in some joint exercises, most notably Peace Mission 2005 and Peace Mission 2007 (which were technically a component of SCO operations).

There is also the issue of military-technical cooperation, which is to say Russian arms sales to China, and the issue of the extent to which the two will engage in joint development projects. However, at present, China has reached a point of saturation with some arms purchases, is determined to develop its own fighter aircraft series, thus voiding the contract that it signed with Russian regarding licensing agreement for the Chinese production of SU-27 aircraft with Russian engines and avionics. Military-technical cooperation between the two at present appears to have stalled. Regarding the national defense strategies of the two, Russia continues to struggle with issues of military modernization and reform, while China is clearly focused on the modernization of its military, with Taiwan a major concern, and the acquisition of a blue water navy another priority.

The reports that millions of Chinese now reside in the Russian Far East are clear fabrications, as is the perception that China has an explicit policy in place to take control of the region. But simple demographics make this a troubling question for Russia: the area is sparsely populated with declining populations in many regions. Meanwhile, the fact is that millions of Chinese reside in the Manchurian region of China alone. Russia faces a significant challenge in devising a workable immigration policy that will provide a legal basis for the entrance of Chinese labor into the region, and further provide for the integration of the Russian Far East into the Asian-Pacific community.

The SCO was originally a Chinese initiative, and the Russians did not devote much attention to it in the Yeltsin era. The Putin administration came to see this as a mistake, and the dynamics of interaction between the two are now more balanced. Russia also has other avenues such as the CSTO. The two states share important congruent interest in the stability of the region, in the suppression of terrorist activities, and in preventing the ascendancy of the US as a dominant player. At the same time, they are economic competitors, especially on the issue of energy procurement, and Russia wishes to preserve its historic role as the dominant external force in the region.

This is another area in which the relationship is not achieving great successes. China has a great need for energy, which Russia possesses, but Russia would prefer to diversify its energy relations in the Asian-Pacific Region. The Russian government under Putin was not enthusiastic about foreign ownership of Russian energy companies, and clearly wants to retain control over the energy sector, or at least keep it under private national ownership for the most part. The current situation in which oil is transported from Russia to China by train is not satisfactory in terms of both cost and supply, but the two states are been negotiating for years over pipeline projects. Whether the pipeline project from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean will have a separate spur into China is still unclear, dispite years of discussion.

It is clear that China has become a major participant in the African energy market. I believe that the uncertainties with Africa make it very difficult to have a well defined strategic role. The Chinese have found themselves the object of considerable unfavourable publicity with respect to their relations with the Sudan government. The problem in Africa is not just the issue of dealing with other competitors, but the complexities of dealing with the domestic governments selling the energy.