In the modern globalized world, in which a new international order of emerging developing countries rules, there are growing concerns about theses countries’ ability to sustain and continue their developments. However, some of those peripheral countries have been gaining some relevance in today’s social dynamics that allowed the economist Jim O’Neill, of the Goldman Sachs group, to publish his thesis about the BRIC, according to which Brazil, Russia, India and China’s economies would soon obliterate today’s richest countries by the year 2050. Brazil holds, in this sense, for its geoeconomic influence, its demographics, dimension of domestic market, for the evaluation of the economic and political factors, as well as for its wide range of problems and challenges, adding to its historic elements of power that it employs, it holds an innate leadership of both regional and continental capacity, thus its importance as an international relations political actor.

Considering this evaluation, extremely positive of the elements of power that Brazil holds, it is only evident its emergence as a power (here going against your assumption) of a “a minor power status of the South-American subcontinent, but instead a regional power, not only within the Mercosul but at the level of the whole Latin American subcontinent. Although highlighting that, until this point Brazil has gone through a long and tortuous road, for the difficulties to face have been, and remain to be, too many.

As a matter of fact, it is important to highlight the fact that Brazil is a country of contrasts, where visible socio-economic inequalities are very common, where there exists an uneven distribution of natural resources and wealth, alienation and sub-regional wars are determining factors. Extreme contrasts characterize the Brazilian society to a point where we need to think of the sub-regional wars not as a problem needing to be subdued, but rather in terms of looking at regional factors that cause them, such as poverty, marginalization, analphabetism, infant mortality, low life expectancy, etc. The social and regional issues are therefore the main issues that still need resolving, and when it does, it will allow Brazil to be effectively considered as a great power.

In the other hand, Brazil has the handicap of not possessing the technology required in what regards its international responsibilities, namely cooperation with other powers. Besides that technology advantage they will not easily hand out, compared to other regional players, it is worth mentioning another element that is making it more difficult Brazil’s ascension in the world powers hierarchy – the United States.

It is a fact, however, that the process of undergoing social shifting that has occurred internally in Brazil for the past 25 years (political democratization and economic liberalization) have altered its constraints for they allow to develop its management capabilities of the elements of power that categorize Brazil as an emerging power. Possessing ethanol, biofuels and recently discovered oil dwells have significantly contributed for the consolidation of this new positioning. Brazil is keen to use these opportunities to overcome the multiple obstacles it faces through the formulation and execution of an extremely active and constant foreign policy. Namely, it is traditionally directed toward the economic spectrum, the one which has been the most used in Brazil’s international insertion in world politics. Still, the ambition to be recognized by the international society as a medium sized power has driven it to enhance its political influence through that commercial-economic framework.

Plus, if Brazil aspires to achieve that recognition as a regional power and medium sized world power, exploring its geographical condition as a country-continent, it will have to assume some positions as to the issues that are today contemplated in world politics. This means the commercial aspect will have to be moderated by a broader political framework that will consider the country’s options regarding the future of Mercosul and, particularly, the review of Brazil-Argentina relations and even more so, other concerns that will allow it to amplify its international ambitions which are much larger than the regional ones. In that matter, the defence of its national sovereignty over the Amazon, the relation with regional powers of Latin America, the participation in peace-keeping operations via UN, the leadership of the mission sent to Haiti in June 2004, with Africa, the Portuguese-speaking countries of CPLP, etc. Brazil’s autonomy in a context of globalization will certainly depend on these factors, as a necessary way for structuring a national project that, surpassing the liberal model of international insertion, will definitely provide it a Logistic State, one that recovers its autonomous decision-making, accepts interdependence and acts internationally according to a development framework, only transferring to the civil society the responsibilities of an Entrepeneuring State. A model that will allow the country to rise as a pole of the multipolar international society.

As a country of great contrasts, Brazil has, in fact, characteristics that put it at the forefront of the hierarchy of power, while others that “place it side by side with situations of development "as described in the previous question. Clearly, these contrasts represent disturbances that slow, above all, the Brazilian projects to be recognised by the international society as a major power. Question also discussed in the previous question. Similarly, if other elements are as likely to cause a disturbance and widespread imbalance and thus hinder the achievement of ambition Brazilian power, they are: drug trafficking, illegal arms trading, finally organized crime in general and excessive economic dependence to the United States Dollar.

This dependence has been for the past two years decreasing as evidenced in rates of economic growth in Brazil, even in the current crisis situation in the United States. On the other hand, Brazil has managed to meet the economic conditions needed to address this crisis, without having the same experience. The Brazilian leaders do not tire, in recent times, to come forward in public to reassure their economic capacity to face this crisis, arguments based on macroeconomic analysis of the country. Basically, what we lack in Brazil in economic terms is to transform this great economic growth in real economic development, with the consequent improvement of living conditions of the Brazilian population. As organized crime, drug trafficking and the illicit arms trade are just words, it is clear that Brazil, like many other countries, suffers from this problem, in fact typical of the international society overall (as of Hedley Bull) in which we live today. Brazil is no exception because the territorial dimension presents difficult procedures for verification and monitoring. From my point of view, the greatest difficulties that this issue poses to Brazil relate to the industrial and business plans. Brazil is not a country that supports organized crime. Brazil is not a country where organized crime can flourish with ease.

Therefore, organised crime existing in Brazil does not raise political problems, namely with the rest of the international society. The organised crime in Brazil hampers economic development because, while Brazil, even today, is very dependent on foreign direct investment, it must provide the conditions for socio-economic stability to attract such investment. Organized crime, especially drug trafficking, influences negatively the conditions of stability, given that drug trafficking - the mode of organised crime that affects Brazil the most - is a destabilising factor that is directly linked to the living conditions of the Brazilian population, which look on this illegal activity easy money to which it could not have otherwise. On the rivalry between Brasilia-Buenos Aires, one that does not include organised crime and dependence on the American dollar as factors that put Brazil “side by side with situations of underdevelopment“, I must say this is a false issue.

This rivalry, in the context of relations with Argentina-Brazil structured since 1870 (when the end of the war of Paraguay brought Brazil a rival in the South American area, by allowing the structuring of Argentina as National Sovereign State), if it actually until the 1980s, is now outdated. The signing in 1979 of the Tripartite Agreement, ending the water dispute, and in 1980, the bilateral Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, ending the nuclear race between the two powers of the Southern Cone, ended with the factors of disagreement that opposed the two countries since 1870. Henceforth, the conditions were met for the two countries to structure their relations in a basic axis of political cooperation, primarily but not exclusively. Thus the Twelve Protocols were signed in 1986, the Treaty of Integration in 1988 and, finally, the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991, cited in a multilateral format, to give rise to the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). Therefore since the early 1980s, relations between Argentina and Brazil were based on a basis of cooperation - for which leaders of each country have contributed significantly to bilateral understandings - the rivalry is quite outdated. It makes no sense to raise it again. Eventually, we may do so in consideration of the statements provided by Cristina Kirchner who took office as president of Argentina, succeeding her husband, Néstor Kirchner. After all, Cristina has subsequently said that a major objective of its programme of government is to reposition Argentina in the hierarchy of power.

Argentina has been absent from the international society, away from matters that were filling the international agenda throughout the Nestor administration, since the country, close to bankruptcy, required above all to solve the serious economic crisis in which it was plunged . This was the central concern that guided, from beginning to end, the Néstor Kirchner administration. There was no space for the internationalists’ affairs. Once passed - at least apparently ... - Argentina is available to return to the international arena and recover the place temporarily lost. Of course, the statements of Cristina in this sense may eventually raise suspicions for a new dispute / rivalry between Argentina and Brazil, particularly for the hegemony in South America But just this. From what I have observed, the fragility of the foundations on which Nestor presidency overcame the crisis, I do not think the country will be able to threaten the hegemony that Brazil today calmly exercises throughout South America, known by many as Brazilian America - as opposed to North America, part of the American continent clearly subject to the influence of the United States.

The Luso-Brazilian relations have suffered great changes in recent decades. However, the lack of critical reflection on these phenomena hinders the understanding between Brazilian and Portuguese peoples. To deepen the understanding of this in order to prepare the future, without losing sight of the past is, therefore, a task of great importance, aimed at giving a new dimension to socio-political-economic Luso-Brazilian exchange. Clearly, the Luso-Brazilian relationship has been developing considerably, especially with the boom of investment that Portuguese businessmen have channelled into the Brazilian economy, which has established itself solidly in 1996, with investments of around 48 million Portuguese escudos (~ 239 million Euros), about a third of the Portuguese investment abroad. Investments that are especially in the area of telecommunications, with Portugal Telecom to acquire large parcels in the privatization of Telebrás, but going through the power sector (through investments made by EDP, Electricity of Portugal), distribution of food (for means of acquisitions made by Sonae and the Jeronimo Martins), water and highways.

By comparison, there is a much smaller Brazilian investment headed to Portugal, which focuses, especially in the banking and financial sector, in construction and public construction, transport and materials for the components of cars, in cosmetics and in advertising and publishing activities, although it is yet to highlight the association of Portuguese cable TV, first with TV Globo and then with the Brazilian TV Record, to supply Portugal with a Brazilian channel run through the network of cable television. In fact there is today a very objective interest of Portuguese investors in Brazil, a result in essence of the conditions that the administration printed the Brazilian domestic market, despite the huge fluctuations that Brazil's economy experienced in the first two years of the twenty-first century. It demonstrated all its vulnerability to the conditions and developments in the international market and, more broadly, throughout the globalized world economy. Vulnerabilities that seem to want to disappear, with the recent strengthening of the Brazilian economy, with Brazilian leaders to say, in the beginning of 2008, that Brazil is economically ready to face any external crisis.

At the sixth annual message of February 6, 2008, forwarded to the National Congress, at the beginning of the legislative year, when the House and Senate officially take over the activities after the summer recess, President Lula, acknowledging there were risks to the growth of the Brazilian economy in the international community, assessed the impact of this phenomenon on the country will be limited, because of "robust domestic demand" and the "strength of the external accounts". The United Nations in 2007, for the first time included Brazil in the group of countries with high human development index. The same Brazil that according to official information dated February 2008, is today, for the first time since the Second World War, an international creditor, because the value of their reserves is higher than the volume of its external debt. Simultaneously, the points of contact between Portugal and Brazil on the international agenda and are more significant than the tensions to work on. The Ambassador of Portugal in Brazil, Francisco Seixas da Costa, noted in this regard that, in terms of strengthening the regional economic-political system, Portugal, which followed the formation of Mercosur, the densification of its policies and its embryo for the Southern Cone regional integration, acknowledged the virtues of the plan for socio-economic development of the countries involved. Although in attempting to strengthen South America through regional integration – even if project of the South American Community of Nations is an interesting evolution in terms of regional cooperation policy - Brazil is contributing to assert itself as a large democratic country that is, as a regional centre of power of articulation of the its surroundings, will facilitate the prevention of intra-regional conflicts and contribute to the creation of platforms for collective dialogue that harmonize any internal tensions in the states of the region.

With a rich and complex international agenda, Brazil positioned itself internationally through the defence of the multilateral system; here also existing a great convergence with the positions taken by Portugal. First, both advocate the need for reform of the UN system, within which the enlargement of the Security Council gained special importance. According to them, an enlargement which should give Brazil the right to a permanent seat in the forum. They even agreed of giving greater utility to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UN), so that it finds it point of articulation with the Security Council in conflict prevention and in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction. Plus, the Portuguese diplomacy is supportive of the widening of the coverage of the International Criminal Court and of the Kyoto agreement and completion of the legislative framework to combat international terrorism. Eventually, this will lead to the transformation of the UN General Assembly in a counter-power to the Security Council, as the proposal of President Lula, so that the General Assembly shoulders its responsibilities in the administration of international peace and security, a position not favoured by Portugal which is however in favour of the strengthening of this body under the UN division of powers.
The Brazilian mission to establish strategic agreements with other states of the South is another priority of the international agenda of Brazil, with which Portugal shows solidarity. Moreover, this option is not against any foreign policy relative to other external dimensions; as opposed to the sequence of stalemates achieved in the North: the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the agreement with the European Union (EU) - Mercosur, the agricultural debate within the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Actually, it is in the context of promoting a political agenda of the South that President Lula has marked all the difference in taking on Brazil as a regional power, a global player in the overall international society. Leader of the G-20, Brazil has furthermore commanded international economic business processes, including in the WTO, relations with the United States and the EU-Mercosur, on which there are serious differences with Portugal which, like other Community partners, has to face great difficulties to get some products into the Brazilian market. Just as Brazil has constantly faced the barriers that agricultural protectionism in the European space have imposed on its products. Going beyond the economic field and strictly bilaterally, Portugal and Brazil sought to build a broader level of understanding, without prejudice to their private relationship. So they created the CPLP, united by a common language and culture, to the benefit of various channels of dialogue.

Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the CPLP and the rapprochement between the EU and Mercosur are likely to play an extremely important role in the path of building a partnership that should be effectively implemented. This is because it is crucial to overcome the traditional shortcomings of bilateral economic relations. Jorge Braga de Macedo calls this bimultilateralism, "because it holds bilateral relations in various affiliations of the two parties. Loyalties based (…) in relations with Mercosur and the American continent as a whole to Brazil and the EU and the Euro-Mediterranean African for Portugal. The unifying element is the sense of belonging to the Lusofonia, sharing large portions of memories of five centuries (…) ". Clearly, the Portugal-Brazil relationship has been left weakened since the halt of Portuguese emigration in the first half of the twentieth century, although the current Brazilian migration going to Portugal will significantly reactivate it. Cultural exchange is in this context a large portion of Luso-Brazilian relations, encouraged, of course, by the Portuguese who live in Brazil and by that huge amount of Brazilians living in Portugal today, although the issue of illegal immigration assumes a great importance as well. It is logical the need to resolve the problems posed by these migrations. Problems not always peaceful, rather complex.

But, in parallel, the Luso-Brazilian relationship, based on a common language and culture, but sustained by shared economic interests, should focus on models of triangulation with corners in Europe and Africa, with mutual benefits from the known geopolitical diagonal of the Atlantic. Of course, being of the BRIC, Brazil holds a vantage position in its foreign policy that allows it to seek recognition as a regional power in Latin America, recognized as medium world power; while Portugal traditionally humble, and whose foreign policy is no more than the ambition to manage current affairs, especially European’s, the bilateral relationship suffers with this imbalance. The visions of the world, the role that each is intended to perform in the international society, their objectives and expectations of the external activities are perceived so by a separate and different manner. The desire for power that Brazil feeds is not shared by Portugal. In this sense, Portugal may have little importance to Brazil, occupying a place reduced to historic, emotional and cultural links in Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil does not need Portugal for the purposes of domestic politics. As it does not need Portugal to act externally. For a closer relationship between Brazil-Europe-European Union, it is perfectly able to establish its own platform and promote by itself relations EU-Mercosur. Similarly, Portugal returned to Europe since 1974, still giving little importance to the Atlantic. Despite the official discourse of giving more importance of the Atlantic in Portuguese foreign policy, as the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Luís Amado, would argue during the past year, the truth is that achieving this ideal did not take place whatsoever. For that Brazil is not a Portuguese foreign policy priority.

However, the Brazilian geopolitics in the era of globalization and the emergence of diverse and complex Brazilian interests outside the American continent, making Brazil a very important country for the near future, to which Portugal, the reduced size of its economy and the dependency external economic relations, should connect itself more visibly, so that to draw additional benefits. The Luso-Brazilian relations are actually much more important for Portugal than to Brazil, whose economic potential allows it to warrant further manoeuvrability on the international stage. It is therefore essential to the Portuguese know and understand the Brazilian vision of the world, fighting for those bilateral relations beyond the literature, emotional promiscuity, to develop socio-political and economic values and benefits. While the recovery of the common heritage of over 500 years, based on the immutable values of preservation and modernization of ties that bind would, of course, guarantee success in multiple Luso-Brazilian relationships.

Lusofonia is a limited space for Brazil to internationally act into. Brazil is dedicating little attention, and relatively to CPLP (Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries), although its headquarters in Lisbon have an excellent ambassador, Dr. Lauro Moreira, it is giving it relatively few importance. It would undoubtedly pay more attention if CPLP would have been created to be led by Brazil. As that is not the case, it is thus very few indeed. The Brazilian interest in the countries of that geopolitical area are basically economic, with Brazil focusing more in countries that present better opportunities of economic profit, as it is clearly the case of Angola. Hence I do not foresee great opportunities for the participation of Brazil in the Lusofonia area, a country whose foreign policy priorities are directed toward other countries and other areas, namely emerging economies.

About the European integration, we have to stress an undeniable fact: there were many times when the European Communities faced periods of scepticism as for the expectations of the integrational evolution, throughout its history. Frustrations of disapproved projects, economic crisis, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 9/11, many were the motives that justified the difficulties that the EU has been through. In the end, always via the axis of France and Germany, the Union was able to surpass such difficulties and even make of the most difficult periods an important contribute for the advancement of the integration. Because the story of the European construction shows that it is after periods of difficulty, of pessimism, that we observe the bigger developments, more profound and meaningful, making the Union prepared to combine the permanent challenges of the enlargement and deepening and, moreover, the tensions between intergovernance and supranationality.

So I do not look at the crisis factors you point out in your question with pessimism. I am hopeful that the very crisis factors will give Europe, projected by the franco-german couple, the strength to move on in a consistent and coherent manner, with the widening matched by political deepening.

The fifth most populous country in the world, the largest Latin American economy and the eight in the world ranking, it is obvious the attention that Brazil attracts for EU member-countries that are now wanting to give a strategic partner status, as it happens with the US, Canada, Japan and the remaining BRIC countries: China, India and Russia. This status will give Brazil the opportunity to establish with the EU a direct dialogue with its top officials, a platform that the EU only concedes to those it perceives as global players. As such, this reveals that Brazil, as a regional and globally emerging power is affirming itself more actively in the international scene, being even referred as a potential Security Council permanent member. It also plays an important role in mediating conflicts between its neighbours – thus putting it side-by-side with other powers, gaining an autonomy in what regards Latin America, as visible with its relationship with the European Union. This reality is ever more visible when we consider the EU’s attention to Brazil, trying to counter-weight the influence of the north-americans. As a curiosity, during President Bush’s tour to Latin America, his first stop was indeed Brazil.

As a result, we are now witnessing a competition between Europe and the United States for Brazil. A competition in which Portugal might unfold an extremely important part. Indeed, the two countries have developed for the past 500 years a diplomatic and historical dialogue that not only puts Brazil as a key piece within the Lusofonia, as also the only Portuguese speaking in Latin America. The EU-Brazil Summit, a 100% Portuguese initiative, has hence acquired a keen relevance, being the first between the two and being held only four days after Portugal took on the Presidency after Germany, assuring that its Presidency would bring a new swift of fresh air into the EU’s agenda, especially in regard to Mercosul. Being stalled in an apparently unsurpassable point, this relations could be widely reinforced by the above cited Summit, making it clear the importance of Portugal and Brazil for the development of such relations, as it has been happening with the EU-Mercosul relations in the 1980s. Although that has not been the achieved goal, as the stalemate continued. In that sense, the EU is the most important trade partner of Brazil, which is the most important Latin American partner of the EU. In March 2007, Brazilian exports to the EU topped 3,12 million US$ (witnessing a growth of 19,59%), when imports reached 2,15 million US$ (a growth of 33,5%).

Of course this relationship could be greatly reinforced by the bilateral free trade agreement that, since April 2000, is being negotiated between the EU and Mercosul. Portugal is one very interested player in the conclusion of this agreement, for, according to data of the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, the Brazilian exports to Portugal, during 2006 reached 1,46 billion US%, while the imports were 312 million US%, a trend that has been constant throughout these first three months of the year, representing a loss of around 1,14 billion US$ to Portugal.

Despite the economic importance of EU-Mercosur relationship, the truth is that it has been anything but peaceful. The high subsidies that the EU gives to its farmers strongly dislike the agricultural and fishing markets that, in response, have prevented the entry in the domestic market of European companies operating in the services sector, particularly in the areas of banking and telecommunications. This stalemate has prevented the progress of the negotiations between the two blocs, not the establishment of the advertising area of bi-regional free trade, hoping that the Portuguese Presidency of the Union, which in 2000 launched the negotiations, will now push to allow the agreement between the parties to be finally conceded. It is undeniable that, historically, the relations between Europe and Latin America began through via Portugal-Brazil relations. It was the Portuguese who discovered the land of Vera Cruz and made it known on the old continent; later on, Portuguese expeditions, followed by Spanish ones, were enlightening the secrets of these lands. It was the Portuguese that, in defence of Brazil, concluded with the Spanish the Treaty of Tordesillas, in 1494, the first legal act that relates Latin America to Europe. From here, the relationship would be continuous.

It is known that in the ideal of the Libertadores (also known as “Liberators”), the independence of the colonies should lead to the birth of a Hispanic America organised under the North American model and that the Bolivarianism was replaced by Pan Americanism, as the growing influence of the United States of America on South America took over. Thus is created the Organization of American States, the OAS and, undoubtedly, Latin American countries held their foreign policies always swinging between the U.S. and Europe. In Europe, for its part and for a long time, they excluded countries that today make up the Mercosur partners from the list of significantly important countries in its trade relations analysis guidelines. After the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC), Member States had turned to the intra-zone. Later, with the signing of the Lomé Convention, the EEC created a general system of preferences that bounded it to the ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific - to which it offered benefits and opportunities. Brazil and other countries in the region, which since the creation of the EEC wanted firstly to celebrate an association agreement and then a mere agreement of cooperation, saw their efforts vanished due to the preferences system of the EU towards the ACP countries.

The EEC boosted, then - or rather, charged by Latin American countries - the organization for the joint appointment of a common institutional spokesman who spoke on behalf of all. Thus the creation of GRULA, the Latin American Group, formed by Latin American ambassadors who active and directly put pressure in the European Commission. However the results were always scarce. Until then, Brazil has only managed to sign with the European Economic Community an agreement composed of statements of intent of cooperation (which dated from 1974). Argentina had a deal in 1971, Uruguay in 1973 and Mexico in 1975. They were called the Agreements of First Generation, by which the EEC directed its action country-to-country and only with those who had economic potential. In 1980, a second agreement was signed with Brazil; in 1983 with the Andean Group; and in 1985 with Central America; these were adopted a broader scope because they included issues such as business and scientific cooperation. It was the second generation of agreements, signed at the time of accession of Portugal and Spain to encourage the Community’ relations with Latin America. With the insistence of the EEC in colective and institutionalized dialogue with Latin America and because of the failures of the GRULA, the EEC agreed to establish a dialogue with the newly established Rio Group - South American countries, Mexico and Panama, the latter would eventually withdraw. This dialogue achieved the Declaration of Rome (1990), which established a formal mechanism for consultation between the chancellors of the Rio Group and the EEC.

The creation of Mercosur in 1991, took another step in the relationship EU-Mercosur, which has already accounted to the Mercosur countries benefits in terms of regional cooperation, which opened access to these countries and EU technology programmes to the European Investment Bank. Still, the preferential system of the Community continued to benefit the ACP countries, the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) - with which the European Union concluded a zone of preferences - the countries of Central and Eastern Europe - after the fall of the Berlin Wall - and the Mediterranean countries - whose products compete directly with the countries of Mercosur. Meanwhile, the announcement of the creation between the U.S., Canada and Mexico of NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Area), in the early 1990s, has led Latin American countries, especially Brazil, to push the relationship with EU to react to the creation of NAFTA, which would change the geopolitical and geostrategic context of the continent, working with existing balances. Indeed, the NAFTA assumed a very seductive option for many Latin American countries trying to counter Brazil, as the effect of this attraction offered an expanded regional integration and alternatives to external pressures that they impelled them to undergo orthodox liberal plans of adjustment. Thus, Brazil has made the objective of Mercosur more daring by trying to convert it into an area endowed with its own momentum, keeping away Argentina from the U.S., and as early as 1993, it launched the proposal to create a Free Trade Area of South America (ALCSA). On the other hand, Brazil has established with South American countries and Africa, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZoPaCAS), a strategy of concentric circles from the Mercosur, and promoted the negotiations with the EU.

In this regard, as well as the new trend of globalization that the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines and encourages, the impetus given to the EU-Mercosur negotiations and the Third Generation Agreements signed between are pushed forward with countries of Latin America. In chronological order, these negotiations included in the year 1990 with Argentina and Chile, in the following year with Uruguay and Mexico, in 1992 with Brazil, under the Portuguese presidency of the EU, and in 1993 with Paraguay and all the countries of Central America. These agreements would now include the democratic and evolutionary clauses. It is also from this season (May 1, 1992) the signing of the Inter-institutional Agreement of Cooperation between the European Commission and the Mercosur Council to promote the transfer of experiences concerning the integration, which led to the creation of the Training Centre for Regional Integration (1993). In this context, more conducive to the rapprochement between the two blocs, the European Council in June 1994 discussed in Corfu the creation of a free trade area between the two, creating an atmosphere favourable to the definitive conclusion of the Fourth Generation Agreements, which culminated in December 1995 with the signing of the most important step towards integration between Mercosur and the European Union.

On December 15, 1995, the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Mercosur and its Member States, on the other hand, signed a framework agreement on inter-regional cooperation which provides basic ground for the gradual liberalisation of trade between the two blocs. From here, negotiations aimed at the integration of Mercosur and the European Union stepped up and several meetings and summits were held several meetings and summits. The European agricultural protectionism, preventing the entry of Latin American products in the European market would, however, halt the negotiations aggravated with the fear of reprisal for closing the public markets to European companies by the authorities of Latin American states.

The nuclear issue is recurring in Brazil since the military dictatorship (1964-1985), both for peaceful as for military purposes, as the same would be accurate for Argentina, given that one and another go relatively similarly in nuclear matters. Every time Brazil gives evidence to initiate a nuclear programme, Argentina follows in the footsteps due to a fear to be left behind. Just like Brazil, each time that Argentina is to take the initiative. Basically, the recurrence of the nuclear issue in Brazil is related to a demarcation policy of asserting its power and specific weight in the international society, as well as to reaffirm their condition of country-power. This is a rhetoric issue of the Brazilian foreign policy. Clearly, the assumption by Brazil of being a nuclear capacity is a possibility that should not be discarded because Brazil has the technology for enriching uranium through a process of centrifuge different from the procedures used by countries that today have nuclear capability, such as France or the United States.

But fundamentally this is a strategy of assertion of power that, as recurrent, gains special importance today, an exercise of power that Brazil wants to take once and for all. An example of this assertion of power was clearly the behavior of Brazil when the International Atomic Energy Agency tried to verify the Brazilian nuclear program - roughly at the same time when it did regarding Iran - facing an intransigent Brazilian resistance, who managed to avoid verification.

I would say that the issue of the Grammar is also a false issue. As the English or Spanish, the Portuguese is written and spoken by millions of people. The countries that have English as the official language or those with Spanish do not feel the need to sign an international agreement imposing common rules on the language. And that is not a reason why they should not continue speaking Portuguese. That is also not a reason why English would no longer the universal language. Indeed, the Languages evolve in accordance with the adjustments that people that write and speak it impose, without the need for international treaties that would require harmonization of rules. The tendency is always for Languages to absorb the changes that people, slowly, over the centuries, make to the language. Therefore, the formalism of the existence of a Grammatical agreement seems unnecessary. It is not needed. Furthermore, the way in which the Agreement is prepared benefits the spelling and the way the Portuguese is spoken in Brazil since the simplifications provided are mostly arranged to harmonize both forms. Portugal will benefit from this agreement in the sense that its language will be spoken in Brazil, a country which, in addition to the geo-political and strategic position, has more than 160 million Portuguese speaking citizens.

However and in my opinion, the truth is that however unnecessary, the Agreement will not create the problems that many voices have announced in Portugal. After all, Portugal will not have to change immediately the procedures and the booking industry will not have to recur to new rules. The new format of the Portuguese language will be required only in official documents, not civil society’s, it is an impossible task to demand from the people who speak and write the Portuguese from Portugal to learn a new Portuguese in such short notice.

The Portuguese-Brazilian relations tend above all to be characterized of a profound mutual ignorance. Neither Portugal devotes to Brazil the attention it should in terms of academic studies, not Brazil devotes that attention to Portugal. The most important initiative policies are not, however, sufficient to arouse the interest in scholars and students. It is therefore a very arduous task, which must be undertaken by all those who want to disclose the studies about Brazil in Portugal in the hope that, in Brazil, teachers and scholars are interested in doing something similar with their vast country. In this sense, it seems to me worthy of praising the initiatives that the Embassy of Brazil in Lisbon, the Portuguese Catholic University and ISCTE have tried to develop to further the studies and academic interest on Brazilian issues.

Personally, I have the task of doing so in ISCSP (Faculty of Social and Political Sciences), which has signed several protocols with several Brazilian universities that does not yet have, however, the required support and participation of students. It seems to me that, complementing of the signing of the protocols, the teaching of Brazil to the students of our school will see the interest in such studies. Only then can the signed protocols have an effective implementation. The course of Specialization in the International Insertion and Foreign Policy of Brazil, which its second edition will commence in July, comes precisely in pursuit of that objective. Basically, it is aimed to all interested in learning International Relations and wish to acquire advanced training in the field of the international insertion and Brazilian foreign policy, as well as all professionals who need that knowledge to take the decisions that are necessary in the exercise of their respective professions.

This is why the course covers the study of the position of Brazil in the BRIC, in regard to globalisation, regionalization, the neighbours of South America and, of course, all major players of today’s international relations, namely the United States, the European Union, Russia and Eastern Europe, without forgetting the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, the global multilateral agencies and multilateral agencies of the inter-American system.